Governmental Immunity: The End of  King\u27s X by Dunahoe, Edwin
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 34 | Number 1
Fall 1973
Governmental Immunity: The End of "King's X"
Edwin Dunahoe
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Edwin Dunahoe, Governmental Immunity: The End of "King's X", 34 La. L. Rev. (1973)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol34/iss1/9
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY: THE END OF "KING'S X"
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has long been the subject of
criticism by legal commentators and in recent years, the theory has
been judicially re-examined in many states. In Louisiana, in the ab-
sence of waiver, the state has enjoyed immunity from suit in both
contract and tort. This Comment, dealing only with the tort aspect,
is intended to determine the extent of governmental immunity re-
maining after Board of Commissioners of Port of New Orleans v.
Splendour Shipping & Enterprise Co.'
Municipal Corporations
An exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity of munici-
palities was first recognized in Stewart v. City of New Orleans.2 In
that case, in order to determine possible liability, a functional dis-
tinction was drawn between the powers possessed by municipal cor-
porations; those exercised for purely public purposes which are held
"as part of the government of the country"3 would be protected by
sovereign immunity, while those "conferred upon it for private
purposes"' would incur liability. This dichotomy is a familiar concept
in the area of inter-governmental taxation where immunity depends
on the nature of the function being performed by the state; thus
"activities thought not to be essential to the preservation of state
governments" are denied immunity.5
The division between the governmental and proprietary func-
tions of the municpality remained the standard on which liability was
based for over one hundred years.' If the function was characteristic
of a private corporate entity, it was proprietary and liability at-
tached. Courts began to consider the profits derived from any partic-
ular power as indicative of a proprietary function.7 While profit may
be an attribute of a private corporation, the mere fact that the exer-
cise of power is profitable does not necessarily make the function
proprietary. The classification of the function should be based on the
1. 273 So. 2d 19 (La. 1973).
2. 9 La. Ann. 461 (1854).
3. Id. at 462. (Emphasis added).
4. Id. (Emphasis added.)
5. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 419 (1938).
6. See Hamilton v. City of Shreveport, 247 La. 784, 174 So. 2d 529 (1965). As will
be discussed in the division of Other State Agencies, this decision removed immunity
from those municipalities having a "sue and be sued" provision in their charter.
7. See Fordham and Pegues, Local Government Responsibility in Tort in
Louisiana, 3 LA. L. REV. 720, 729 (1940).
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relation of the type of public service rendered to the municipality's
duty to provide that service.
Other State Agencies
Municipalities can be distinguished from other subdivisions of
state government as complete governing units, somewhat "indepen-
dent" from the state, and capable of conducting, on a reduced scale,
all the functions of government. Since the municipality is a conglom-
erate of governmental and proprietary powers, a functional test was
an appropriate determinent of sovereign immunity. State agencies,
on the other hand, are departments of the executive branch of govern-
ment traditionally performing purely administrative functions, and
bearing a closer relation to the sovereign state than the municipality.'
In light of this administrative purpose, the distinction between gov-
ernmental and proprietary functions is not an appropriate test of
whether to impose liability on a state agency. As a result, the doctrine
arose that the state or its agencies could only be sued through express
legislative authorization. However, the supreme court held in Duree
v. Maryland Casualty Company' that legislative authorization to sue
the state was only a waiver of immunity from suit, not a waiver from
liability. The Duree decision, reaffirmed shortly thereafter in
Stephens v. Natchitoches Parish School Board,"' reduced any legisla-
tive authorization to an empty promise, since the state could later
assert the defense of no cause of action. This was corrected in 1960
by an amendment to Article III, § 35 of the Louisiana Constitution
which stated in part that
each authorization by the Legislature for suit against the State
or other such public body, heretofore and hereafter enacted or
granted, shall be construed to be and shall be effective and valid
for all purposes, as of and from the date thereof, as a waiver of
the defendant's immunity both from suit and from liability.
This amendment was construed in Hamilton v. City of
Shreveport" to mean that the legislature was empowered to waive
8. See Fordham and Pegues, Local Government Responsibility in Tort in
Louisiana, 3 LA. L. REv. 720 (1940). See also Terrebone Par. Sch. Bd. v. St. Mary Par.
Sch. Bd., 131 So. 2d 266 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
9. 238 La. 166, 114 So. 2d 594 (1959).
10. 238 La. 388, 115 So. 2d 793 (1959). See also LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 26. For a
comprehensive study of the situation surrounding these cases, see McMahon and
Miller, The Crain Myth-A Criticism of the Duree and Stephens Cases, 20 LA. L. Rzv.
499 (1960).
11. 247 La. 784, 174 So. 2d 529 (1965).
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immunity from suit and liability, and such waiver extended to gov-
ernmental and proprietary functions. In that case, the court reasoned
that a waiver was effectuated by the "sue and be sued" provision in
Shreveport's city charter, since that charter was legislatively author-
ized. 2 It was argued in Bazanac v. State, Department of Highways3
that since Hamilton dealt only with a city charter, the decision had
no effect on the immunity of other state agencies, although they had
a similar provision in their charters. The supreme court rejected that
argument and held that the "sue and be sued" provision in the
charter or organic act of any governmental body enumerated in the
1960 amendment must be construed as a general waiver of immunity
from suit." As a result of the constitutional amendment and its judi-
cial construction, the number of state agencies subject to suit tremen-
dously increased. There still remained, however, many agencies
which lacked a "sue and be sued" provision in their charters, and
were therefore immune.
Splendour
In Board of Commissioners of Port of New Orleans v. Splendour
Shipping & Enterprise Co., 5 the Board of Commissioners filed suit
for damages sustained when Splendour's vessel struck a bridge oper-
ated by the Board." Splendour answered generally, alleging contribu-
12. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 40(c) provides in part that "[tihe Legislature shall
provide by general law a method whereby any municipality may frame a home rule
charter and adopt same by a vote of the majority of its qualified electors voting thereon
at an election to be held as prescribed by law." Prior to Hamilton, the supreme court
in Westwego Canal & Trans. Co. v. Louisiana Highway Comm'n, 200 La. 990, 9 So.
2d 389 (1942), had held that the provision in a state agency's charter, that it possessed
the power to sue and be sued, was not a waiver of tort liability.
13. 218 So. 2d 121 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
14. See Herrin v. Perry, 254 La. 933, 228 So. 2d 649 (1969) (which had been
decided between the appellate decision and the hearing of Bazanac by the supreme
court.)
15. 273 So. 2d 19 (La. 1973).
16. A somewhat concealed aspect of Splendour is the determination that although
the case fell within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, the State was still able
to invoke the defense of governmental immunity. Counsel for Splendour had argued,
in its brief, that Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552 (1900) precluded the defense
of governmental immunity, as it conflicted with the symmetric and uniform applica-
tion of the admiralty laws. The Board, relying on Ex Parte State of New York, 256 U.S.
490 (1921), successfully distinguished Workman. Ex Parte State of New York dealt
with the issuance of writs of prohibition to a United States District Court which sought
to exercise jurisdiction over the state of New York. In issuing the writs, the Court said
"[m]uch reliance is placed upon Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552. But that
dealt with a question of the substantive law of admiralty, not the power to exercise
1973]
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tory negligence and filed a reconventional demand for damages to its
ship. The Board then interposed the defense of sovereign immunity
to the reconventional demand. Since the state instituted the litiga-
tion and sought damages, defendant could be classified as the passive
party in this litigation, attempting only to reduce its losses by inter-
posing a recognized defense to a claim of negligence. The court of
appeal found that as an agency of the state, the Board enjoyed im-
munity as there had been no express waiver by the legislature. The
supreme court reversed, holding that the Board of Commissioners
and "other such boards and agencies" were not immune from suit in
tort. '1
The theory of governmental immunity rests upon an idea which
has little justification in modern law. It began in England as a per-
sonal attribute of the King and later, through a somewhat uncertain
process, was extended to the state." Its application in the United
States is basically unsound, since "the keystone of American political
thought has been responsible government"'" and the idea that the
government is above the people is inconsistent with this premise. Any
assertion of governmental immunity is subject to at least one overrid-
ing objection-it is basically unfair. If the theory of responsible gov-
ernment is accepted as proper, then any negligence should create
liability for which the government should respond. To hold otherwise
jurisdiction over the person of defendant; and, in the opinion, the court was careful to
distinguish between the immunity from jurisdiction attributable to a sovereign upon
grounds of policy, and immunity from liability in a particular case. Thus (p. 566): 'The
contention is, although the corporation had general capacity to stand in judgment, and
was therefore subject to the process of a court of admiralty, nevertheless the admiralty
court would afford no redress against the city for the tort complained of, because under
the local law,' etc. 'But the maritime law affords no justification for this contention,
and no example is found in such law, where one who is subject to suit and amenable
to process is allowed to escape liability for the commission of a maritime tort, upon
the theory relied upon.' " Ex Parte State of New York, 256 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1921).
From this extract, it appears the Court is saying that if the state once submits to the
jurisdiction of the Court, the defense of governmental immunity will not be available,
but the state may validly refuse to submit, and in such case, the state would not be
subject to process. In Splendour it must therefore be assumed that the decision is based
on the presumption that if the case had been brought in federal court, the Board would
have excepted to jurisdiction over it. Otherwise the entire opinion, strictly speaking,
would be dicta, since the court would have been forced to apply the substantive law
of admiralty which does not recognize governmental immunity as a defense. See Work-
man v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552 (1900).
17. Board of Comm'rs v. Splendour Shipping Ent. Co., 273 So. 2d 19, 26 (La.
1973).
18. See Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA.
L. REV. 476 (1953).
19. Id. at 480.
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puts the state above the law and answerable to no one. This inherent
unfairness seemed most persuasive to the court in Splendour.0
The Splendour court found a conflict between the doctrine of
governmental immunity and the Louisiana Constitution. Article
I, § 6 states in part that "every person for injury done him shall have
adequate remedy by due process of law and justice administered
without denial, partiality or unreasonable delay." Prior to Splendour,
this provision, in force since 1864, had never been held to be incon-
sistent with the rule of governmental immunity. Both Justice
McCaleb and Justice Summers argued that the 1960 constitutional
amendment, which set forth certain guidelines for suit against state
subdivisions, elevated the jurisprudential doctrine of sovereign im-
munity to constitutional status. Thus they argued that this could
preclude the doctrine's abrogation by judicial fiat. Justice Summers
stated that
not only is the Legislature's right to waive immunity from suit
not abrogated, the right is instead, implicitly recognized and ap-
proved, confirmed and strengthened. It follows, therefore, unless
the State's sovereign immunity is waived by the Legislature, that
immunity is retained.2'
While this position is arguable, it would seem that the purpose
of the amendment was to provide an administrative procedure
whereby suit could be brought against the state, and not to set forth
governmental immunity as a fundamental principle. The develop-
ment of governmental immunity has been almost exclusively con-
trolled by the courts and it would be inconsistent to say that it has
been removed from the courts' grasp by implication.
The statement in Splendour that the Board of Commissioners
"and other such boards and agencies are not immune from suit in
tort,"2 is a broad rejection of governmental immunity, sufficient to
negate the assertion of the defense by any political subdivision. Since
state agencies have been traditionally considered "closer" to the state
than municipalities,' it would be anomalous to allow municipalities
to claim immunity while denying it to state boards and agencies.
Other Jurisdictions
As noted in Splendour, many other states have abrogated the
20. 273 So. 2d 19, 25 (La. 1973).
21. Id. at 29.
22. Id. at 26.
23. Fordham and Pegues, Local Government Responsibility in Tort in Louisiana,
3 LA. L. REV. 720 (1940).
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rule of governmental immunity with certain limitations."4 The court
in Splendour did not place any restriction on the type of activity
subject to liability or specify which public bodies will enjoy immun-
ity. Other jurisdictions have put some limitation on their abrogation,
and if this is to occur in Louisiana, the standards set forth by other
courts will be helpful in formulating the best rule. Many states have
limited the defense to certain public bodies. Florida was the first
jurisdiction to abolish the doctrine of governmental immunity in a
case where a municipality was held liable for the torts of its police-
men. " The court purported to remove the doctrine only with regard
to municipalities, and this concept of narrow removal subsequently
was followed in Illinois2 1 and Michigan.
2
1
Recent cases have expanded the concept of narrow removal.28 In
Brown v. City of Omaha,'2 1 a Nebraska court held that immunity may
no longer be asserted by "cities and all other governmental subdivi-
sions and local public bodies. '3 New Jersey, in Willis v. Department
of Conservation and Economic Development,' extended the right to
sue governmental bodies to include the state as a separate entity.
Colorado, the most recent state to reject the doctrine, sanctioned suit
against a county, school district, or the state itself.32 This pattern
lends support to the conclusion that the Splendour reasoning would
24. Board of Comm'rs v. Splendour Shipping Ent. Co., 273 So. 2d 19, 25 (La.
1973).
25. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
26. Molitor v. Kaneland Comm. Unit Dist., 18 I1. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
27. Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961).
28. California, in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d
457 (1961), began a trend of broadening the scope of the removal. Speaking for the
court, Justice Traynor discarded governmental immunity, and expressed no outer limit
for the abrogation. Although other states followed with similar broad rejections, the
trend appears to have been changed by a series of decisions from 1963 to 1968. See City
of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1964); Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239,
429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964); Rice v.
Clark County, 79 Nev. 253, 382 P.2d 605 (1963). Upon investigation, however, it is
found that these decisions were either based on an existing statute, (see City of Fair-
banks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1964)), or that the limitations placed on the
abrogation were reduced by later rulings, (see City of Louisville v. Louisville Seed Co.,
433 S.W.2d 638 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968)). It appears that only Nevada and Arkansas were
inconsistent with the liberal trend begun by Muskopf.
29. 183 Neb. 430, 160 N.W.2d 805 (1968).
30. Id. at 809.
31.. 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970).
32. Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 482 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1971); Proffitt v.
State, 482 P.2d 965 (Colo. 1971); Flournoy v. School Dist. No. 1, 482 P.2d 966 (Colo.
1971).
COMMENTS
subject boards, agencies, and municipalities to liability for tortious
conduct.
Other jurisdictions have confined immunity to certain classes of
activities performed by public bodies. "Judicial or legislative acts,
33
including those functions which involve discretion in the manner of
performance, and those which are the exercise of a judicial, legisla-
tive, quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative power34 are given the benefit
of immunity. The reasoning behind the "discretion" aspect of this
restriction is that when powers are delegated from the state to public
bodies, they must have the right to select the best method of perform-
ance without the imposition of liability. This classification is ob-
viously broad and has prevented an objective standard by which to
ascertain liability, as illustrated in Catto v. Schnepp.3 5 Plaintiff was
involved in an automobile accident and sought to impose liability on
the municipality by alleging negligent construction of the highway.
The court held that "the Township's conduct involving the design
and reconstruction of the road in question was one 'resting in the
discretionary judgment of the governing body' "3 and therefore not
subject to review. This case indicates the broad area which may be
included in the realm of discretionary acts, and the improbability of
a practical standard by which to determine liability.
Similarly, "ministerial" or nondiscretionary acts done in further-
ance of a power conferred on a public body by the judiciary or legisla-
ture do not incur liability.37 Ministerial acts have been said to include
the promulgation of zoning ordinances38 and malicious prosecution.3 9
It seems, however, that this aspect of the restriction may be extended
to include many situations which should not be shielded from liabil-
ity. For example, a Florida court has held that no tort action will lie
against a municipality for property loss caused by the negligent ac-
tions of a fire crew, since the selection and maintenance of proper
firemen is an exercise of a legislative or quasi-legislative power. 0 In
Middleton v. City of Fort Walton Beach,4 an arrest warrant, known
33. See Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 160 N.W.2d 805 (1968); Willis v.
Department of Cons. and Eco. Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970).
34. See note 38 infra.
35. 121 N.J. Super. 506, 298 A.2d 74 (1972).
36. Id. at 76.
37. Spanel v. Mounds View Sch. Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795
(1962).
38. Allen v. Secor, 195 So. 2d 586 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967).
39. See Middleton v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 113 So. 2d 431, 432 (Fla. Ct. App.
1959).
40. Steinhardt v. Town of North Bay Village, 132 So. 2d 764 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961).
41. 113 So. 2d 431 (Fla. Ct. App. 1959).
1973]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
to be false by the issuer and the arresting officer, was issued for
plaintiff's arrest. The court stated that even assuming that the par-
ties were acting within the scope of their employment, the city would
not be liable since the acts involved were quasi-judicial in character."
Other jurisdictions have taken a "duty" approach as to which
activities would be immune from liability; that is, liability attaches
only if the governmental body owes a duty to the particular person
who is injured. : In City of Louisville v. Louisville Seed Company,44
a Kentucky court defined the restriction as follows:
Where the act affects all members of the general public alike, it
would be unreasonable to apply to it the broad principles of tort
liability. But, when the city, by its dealings or activities, seeks
out or separates the individual from the general public and deals
with him on an individual basis, as any other person might do,
it then should be subjected to the same rules of tort liability as
are generally applied between individuals.45
A Florida court reached a similar conclusion in Modlin v. City
of Miami Beach," in which an overhead mezzanine floor collapsed,
killing plaintiff's wife. Plaintiff alleged negligence by the city for
improper inspection of the building. The court found that the per-
formance of this duty, the enforcement of the building code, was owed
to the general public, not specifically to the deceased, and the city
was therefore not liable. The same theory was relied on by an Arizona
court where a policeman failed to stop a drunken driver under cir-
cumstances giving the officer notice of his condition, and a wreck
resulted shortly thereafter, killing the other driver.47
It appears that while a total removal of the defense of govern-
mental immunity might be theoretically ideal, practically it is not
feasible, largely because of the extent to which the public depends on
governmental services. Suppose Louisiana provided a hurricane
warning system whereby residents of coastal towns were alerted to
approaching hurricanes. If, due purely to the negligence of the opera-
tors, a hurricane was charted to strike Town X, but in actuality, was
42. Id. at 432.
43. See Massengill v. Yuma, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969); Modlin v. City of
Miami Beach, 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967); Huey v. Town of Cicero, 41 Ill. 2d 361, 243
N.E.2d 214 (1968); City of Louisville v. Louisville Seed Co., 433 S.W.2d 638 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1968).
44. 433 S.W.2d 638 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
45. Id. at 643.
46. 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967).
47. Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969).
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going to, and struck Town Y, liability would result. The residents of
Y would have a cause of action for negligent failure to warn, while
the residents of X could sue for the expenses incurred by removal of
their goods. If the state were faced with this possibility of liability,
the solution would be to cease performance of the service. As a policy
matter, we cannot afford to discourage the performance of govern-
mental services; thus, it seems necessary to excuse negligence in cer-
tain situations. The question remains, which immunity rule would
provide the most satisfactory result?
The "judicial or legislative acts" restriction appears undesirable.
There are few functions performed by a public body which could not
be said to involve a certain degree of discretion and, as Catto illus-
trates, the courts have shown considerable latitude in determining
what does or does not involve discretion. The test for imposition of
liability should be distinct, and if given a broad and somewhat vague
category, the courts will be faced with the same problems that existed
in the determination of whether a particular function was govern-
mental or proprietary. Similarily Middleton illustrates how the "judi-
cial and legislative power" aspect may be expanded.48
The "special duty" restriction appears to provide the most pract-
ical solution. It provides a well defined standard by which to deter-
mine the liability of a governmental body. For example, a person
injured by the operation of a garbage truck could recover by showing
negligence, with no need to show that the nature of the function falls
within a certain category. Also, it has the effect of limiting the liabil-
ity of the state by preventing the state or agency from being liable to
a large number of people. However harsh this may appear in certain
situations, it seems necessary to excuse the negligence of the state
where services of a public nature are performed. This is not to advo-
cate a return to the governmental-proprietary distinctions. The basis
of the special duty exception is that there must be a duty owed to
the injured individual which is different from that owed the general
public. If this duty is found, the nature of the function is irrelevant.
The governmental-proprietary rule, however, looks to the nature of
the function first and then, if it is found to be proprietary, ordinary
tort rules govern. It appears that duty should be the paramount
question in a tort case and not the nature of the particular function
being performed by the negligent actor.
Another possible solution to the problem of formulation of stan-
dards could be legislative. As a result of judicial removal of govern-
48. Steinhardt v. Town of North Bay Village, 132 So. 2d 764 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961).
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mental immunity several state legislatures have reinstated the doc-
trine entirely or partially, or passed acts to define and limit the
state's liability." The most comprehensive of these acts has been
passed by California and Illinois." Under the California plan, certain
functions of government are classified as either subject to or exempt
from liability, thereby adding continuity to the development of gov-
ernmental liability." Any Louisiana legislative action will undoubt-
edly have to wait the fate of the proposed constitution which provides
in Article III, § 14(A) that "[n]either the state nor any of its agen-
cies or political subdivisions shall be immune from suit and liability
in contract or for injury to person or property." However, in the




Splendour marks a major breakthrough in the area of govern-
mental liability in Louisiana, and although the court has not indi-
cated whether any restrictions will be placed on this liability, it is
strongly suggested that there be some limitation. Care must be taken
in the development of any limitation if Splendour is to enable just
results, and it is recommended that the special duty restriction be
adopted to facilitate the development of a practical, distinct stan-
dard.
Edwin Dunahoe
49. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2901 (1969); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 8.10-.90 (1964); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 1-101 to 9-107 (1965) (Smith-Hurd 1965); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 46-901 to -911 (1970); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.996(101)-.996(115) (1965);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.01-.17 (1963); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 41.031-.033 (1965), 41.0335
(1969), 41.035-.038 (1965), 41.039 (1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.92.010 (1963),
4.92.030 (1971), 4.92.090 (1963), 4.92.100 (1967), 4.92.110-.120 (1963), 4.92.130-.131
(1969), 4.92.140-.150 (1963), 4.92.160-.170 (1969), 4.96.010-.020 (1967).
50. Illinois has limited the abrogation to municipalities. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
85, § 1-206 (Smith-Hurd 1965).
51. The California Law Revision Commission did not choose to follow the Federal
Tort Claims Act, reasoning that there were inherent problems "in a statute ... that
waives immunity from liability generally and attempts to specify exceptions to govern-
mental liability." California Law Revision Commission, Recommendations Relating to
Sovereign Immunity, Vol. 4, Page 812 (1963).
52. In Evangelical United Breth. Church of Adna v. State, 407 P.2d 440 (Wash.
1965), despite the fact that the Washington legislature had provided "[t]he state
.... whether acting in its governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for
damages arising out of its tortious conduct," the court held that this did not apply to
discretionary acts of officials.
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